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When More is Less—SWAT and Procedural 
Justice 
Timothy C. MacDonnell∗ 
Abstract 
Since the “war on drugs” began in the early 1970s the use of 
Special Weapons and Tactics units has increased exponentially. 
These units, originally designed to address unique policing 
situations like riots or a barricaded gun man, are now 
deploying  approximately 60,000 times a year. Over half of those 
deployments are for search warrants. Because SWAT units deploy 
assuming that they are going to a situation with a high likelihood 
of violence, their tactics reflect that assumption. SWAT means and 
methods emphasize the decisive use of force to resolve conflicts. 
These means and methods do not encourage communication 
between police and citizens, only compliance. At the same time that 
SWAT units were becoming more common, two professors 
published the highly influential book Procedural Justice. In that 
book the authors sought to understand how procedure in the 
resolution of legal disputes connected to justice. Since then, 
scholars, most notably Professor Tom Tyler, have empirically 
examined the connection between procedure and individual 
perceptions of justice. Much of that research has noted a powerful 
connection between an individual’s perception of justice and 
whether they believed they “have had their say” in the resolution of 
a dispute. This research has also asserted connections between 
procedural justice and the public’s perceptions of police legitimacy 
and the further connection between police legitimacy and law 
abiding behavior. Despite the growing recognition that police 
legitimacy and procedural justice walk hand in hand, the growth 
of SWAT has continued. This article examines the rise of SWAT and 
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procedural justice, and discusses how the overuse of SWAT units is 
harmful to procedural justice and the public’s perception of police 
legitimacy. Finally, the article suggests that use of SWAT assets 
during the execution of a search warrant should be at the discretion 
of judges rather than police. Additionally, the article suggests that 
command and control over SWAT units should be centralized at the 
state and federal levels to ensure proper use and training.  
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I. Introduction 
At 6 a.m. on January 5, 2014, police officers, clad in body 
armor and black uniforms, allegedly broke down the door to the 
apartment rented by Tabatha Werkmeister and Grinage Dion 
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Wilson in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania.1 Next, the officers deployed a 
smoke grenade and quickly detained all the residents in the home.2 
Those residents included Ms. Werkmeister, Mr. Wilson, and their 
four children, ages two through nine.3 The family was taken from 
their home barefoot in their nightclothes and placed in an 
unheated police van where an officer stood guard with an assault 
style rifle.4 The temperature outside was approximately 20 degrees 
Fahrenheit.5 After police searched for around 25 minutes the 
family was led back into their home, given a card to apply for 
reimbursement for the broken door, and told that they should have 
their apartment number affixed to their front door.6 In other 
words, the police got the wrong house.  
In an interview after the incident, Ms. Werkmeister stated she 
did not understand what was going on when the police broke down 
her door or why the police were in her home.7 In the lawsuit that 
has been filed, Ms. Werkmeister and her boyfriend, Mr. Wilson, 
allege that police offered no explanation for the detention or search 
or an apology.8 The lawsuit further alleges that the couple’s 
children are now frightened of police to such a degree that they will 
not spend time with their grandmother, a lieutenant in the 
Pittsburgh police, if she is wearing her uniform.9 
The manner in which police entered the Werkmeister/Wilson 
home is called a “dynamic entry” and is a technique commonly used 
by the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Community to secure 
                                                                                                     
 1. See City of Pittsburg Named in Lawsuit Stemming from Armed Raid of 
Family’s Home, WPXI (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:30 AM), www.wpxi.com/news/local/city-
pittsburgh-named-lawsuit-temming-armed-raid-/32186989 (discussing a civil 
complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, Case 2:15-cv-01069-MRH, filed August 13, 2015) (on file with 
author). A spokesperson for the police claimed the Werkmeister/Wilson family 
was removed from the apartment for safety reasons. Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Complaint in Civil Action at 1, Werkmeister v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 
2:15cv1069 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2015).  
 9. Id. at 7.  
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a location.10 When using this technique officers employ surprise, 
speed, and overwhelming force to secure the target.11 The term 
used by some SWAT literature is to “dominate” a target.12 To 
achieve this result SWAT teams will usually enter a structure via 
two “breach” locations or points of entry.13 When “breaching,” tools 
like battering rams and modified crowbars are often used.14 Next, 
a diversionary device is commonly employed—these include smoke 
and “flash-bang” grenades.15 To ensure adequate force, some 
SWAT units assign two officers to each “problem.”16 Problems 
include rooms and people.17 Thus, overwhelming force is used to 
converge at a decisive point while maximizing speed and surprise 
to the advantage of the SWAT team.18  
These techniques all appear to be appropriate when SWAT 
teams are facing a hostage situation or barricaded gunman, but in 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Karena Rahall, The Green Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the 
Police Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1817 (2015) (“’Dynamic 
entry’ raids have become an integral part of SWAT tactics, even when police have 
no information to conclude that officers might be in danger.”).  
 11. Glenn French, Dynamic Entry Versus Deliberate Entry, POLICEONE.COM 
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/SWAT/articles/ 2154851-Dynamic-
entry-versus-deliberate-entry/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 12. Moore v. Weekly, 159 F. Supp. 3d 784, 790–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); see also 
French, supra note 11 (stating that the standard across the country for dynamic 
entries is to “use . . . an overwhelming amount of dominating force.”).  
 13. See Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing a 
common dynamic entry where a SWAT team threw stun grenades into a rear 
window and threw another into the front door followed by breaching the door 
(citing Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations 
Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 
673, 682–83 (2001)); see also BURLINGTON POLICE DEP’T, AFTER ACTION TRAINING 
REPORT 16 (2012), acluofnorthcarolina.org/ 
files/militarization%20docs/Burlington%20PD%20(11).pdf (“plan to breach two 
entry points.”). 
 14. See, e.g., BURLINGTON POLICE DEP’T, supra note 13, at 9 (providing 
examples of how SWAT breaches a structure). 
 15. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1812 n.197 (“Flash-Bangs are used by 
special units during hostage rescue and high-risk warrants.”). 
 16. See French, supra note 11 (discussing that usually two operators enter a 
room together, sometimes three or more depending upon the size of the room). 
 17. See id. (emphasizing that the goal is to go room to room, clearing “areas 
of responsibilities.”). 
 18. See id. (explaining the use of overwhelming force with critical speed to 
the point “you can effectively engage your adversary” in order to surprise them, 
giving you an “opportunity to neutralize your threat before he engages you.”). 
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the vast majority of cases where SWAT teams are used they are 
not facing such formidable opposition. Of the approximately 60,000 
SWAT deployments a year,19 over half are to execute drug search 
warrants, usually in homes.20  
The experience described by individuals who have been 
present during a dynamic entry often includes words like 
frightening or terrifying.21 These emotional responses are by 
design.22 As mentioned above, the dynamic entry technique is 
meant to dominate a target by being frightening and disorienting, 
thereby preventing individuals from mounting a coherent forceful 
response.23 But with SWAT teams being deployed as much as 
60,000 times in a year,24 with approximately 62% of those 
                                                                                                     
 19. Ilya Shapiro & Randal John Meyer, When the SWAT Team Calls, the 
Constitution Goes Out the Window, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2015, 11:03 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/when-swat-team-calls-constitution-goes-out-
window-373663 (on file with author). But see Peter B. Kraska, Militarization 
and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Policing, 1 POLICING 501, 506 (Dec. 
13, 2007), http://cjmasters.eku.edu/sites/cjmasters.eku.edu/files/21stmilitari 
zation.pdf (estimating the rate of SWAT deployments to be at 45,000 in 2006); see 
also Radley Balko, Shedding Light on the Use of SWAT Teams, WASH. POST (Feb. 
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/ 
02/17/shedding-light-on-the-use-of-swat-teams/?utm_term=.3537d973d24d (“The 
criminologist Peter Kraska has estimated that there are somewhere between 
50,000 and 80,000 SWAT raids per year now in America, and that number is 
likely growing”) (on file with author). 
 20. See Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19 (“Today. . . extreme situations 
account for only a small fraction of SWAT deployments; they’re used primarily to 
serve low-level drug-search warrants.”); Radley Balko, New ACLU Report Takes 
a Snapshot of Police Militarization in the United States, WASH. POST (June 24, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/06/24/new-
aclu-report-takes-a-snapshot-of-police-militarization-in-the-united-
states/?utm_term=.eec64d715fc5) (noting over half of SWAT actions were in 
private homes) (on file with author). 
 21. See Astead W. Herndon, Residents Rip Police After Lengthy SWAT 
Standoff, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro 
/2016/10/16/revere-standoff-with-swat-team-ends-
peacefully/UgaCM7RXNCeradQSlNgS4M/story.html (describing the fear the 
family felt after being recipients of a SWAT raid) (on file with author). 
 22. See Rahall, supra note 10 (discussing that raids are terrifying); see also 
French, supra note 11 (describing that when SWAT members tactfully enter 
rooms, it is for the purpose of disorienting and confusing adversaries). 
 23. French, supra note 11. 
 24. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19; see Balko, supra note 19 (saying that 
SWAT raids are somewhere between 50,000 and 80,000 per year). 
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deployments being used to execute drug search warrants,25 what 
else is being achieved in a dynamic entry? What impact does this 
SWAT technique and other SWAT methods have on the public’s 
perception of police legitimacy? Further, why, in the absence of 
some express authority from a court, should police be permitted to 
use such techniques? These questions are the focus of this Article. 
Section Two of this Article focuses on the impact of police 
military-style tactics and equipment on public perception of police 
legitimacy.26 The expectation that professional police forces should 
be distinct from the military is embedded in Anglo-American law 
and the policing traditions of England and the United States.27 A 
number of important differences support this bright line, but 
recent scholarship regarding the public’s perception of fairness, 
justice, and why individuals “obey the law,” provides even more 
compelling justification for a bright line distinction between 
military and police. Beginning in the mid-1970s with the 
influential book Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis28 and 
continuing today with the scholarship of Professor Tom Tyler,29 an 
argument has been made that the impact of procedural justice on 
the public’s acceptance of police authority, and the rule of law in 
general, is powerful.30 This section will examine the creation and 
                                                                                                     
 25. Id. But see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE 
MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 2 (2014), [hereinafter ACLU, WAR COMES 
HOME] https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14-
warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf (saying that 62% of SWAT deployments were for 
drug search warrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 26. See infra Section II (“Procedural Justice and the Language and 
Equipment of War.”). 
 27. See Principles of Good Policing, CIVITAS, http://civitas.org.uk/research/ 
crime/facts-comments/principles-of-good-policing/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) 
(listing Sir Robert Peel’s “Nine Principles of Policing,” which, along with the 
passage of the “Bill for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis” in 1829, 
were influential in modernizing the urban police force). 
 28. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 29. See generally E.A. LIND & T.R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); T.R. TYLER & S. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); T.R. 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE (2011). 
 30. See infra Section II.A (“Procedural Justice”) (discussing how procedural 
justice is critically linked to the public’s acceptance of aspects of police, such as 
their legitimacy and authority). 
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rise of SWAT, and how SWAT means and methods impact the core 
elements of procedural justice.31 
Section Three of this Article discusses the current rules that 
govern SWAT execution of search warrants.32 SWAT units possess 
no greater authority than any other police units and are thus 
subject to the same limitations. Although the manner in which a 
search warrant is executed is usually left to police that does not 
mean police discretion is unfettered. 33 The Fourth Amendment 
governs the manner in which search warrants are executed and 
the United States Supreme Court has provided guidance on the 
subject.34 Although there are no Supreme Court cases that 
explicitly state SWAT operations are subject to the same 
limitations as any other police activity, there are no cases where 
the Court has suggested that SWAT operates under different 
rules.35 
Section Four discusses measures designed to ensure that 
when SWAT forces are deployed there are adequate justifications 
for their use and for the particular tactics they employ.36 Terrorist 
attacks, hostage situations, and criminals equipped with weapons 
that can outmatch standard police issue are all threats that 
support the need for some type of SWAT capability.37 Who 
determines under what circumstances a SWAT deployment occurs 
                                                                                                     
 31. Infra Section II.B (“SWAT”). 
 32. Infra Section III (“Fourth Amendment and SWAT”). 
 33. See L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614 (2007) (executing a search 
warrant, an officer “may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to 
ensure their own safety.”); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (“It 
is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure the search is 
lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted.”); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 
31 (2003) (saying that police have the ability to execute warrants without 
knocking first when they garner reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances); 
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (“[T]he manner in which a warrant is 
executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reasonableness.”). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 35. Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Outfitting 
sheriff's deputies in hooded combat fatigues, arming them with laser-sighted 
weapons and ordering them to conduct the ‘dynamic entry’ of a private home does 
not exempt their conduct from Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.”). 
 36. Infra Section IV (“Solutions”). 
 37. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1818 (saying that the “original purpose of 
SWAT was to respond to active shooter, barricaded suspects, and hostage 
situations.”). 
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and what techniques are authorized, however, is variable.38 In 
some jurisdictions, it is a police decision.39 Some states have passed 
statutes that require police to seek authorization to execute a “no 
knock” search warrant.40 I will suggest a system that limits SWAT 
use for executing warrants (arrest and search) to circumstances 
where a magistrate finds articulable facts that support the 
deployment of SWAT and the specific techniques to be applied.41 
Further, in circumstances where police could have secured a 
warrant prior to taking action that authorized SWAT means and 
methods but did not, claims of exigent circumstances should be 
looked at more closely.42 Additionally, I will suggest that the many 
disparate SWAT units fall under centralized state and federal 
chains of command.43 It is essential to effective SWAT operations 
that SWAT officers are highly trained and used only when 
necessary. Most police departments with SWAT units do not have 
the resources to permit their SWAT officers to be dedicated 
exclusively to conducting SWAT training and operations.44 Thus, 
most SWAT officers are, in effect, part time SWAT—with their 
duties being divided between other policing responsibilities and 
SWAT.45 By centralizing and consolidating SWAT resources at the 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Ian Evans, Who Watches the Stormtroopers? Judicial Oversight as a 
Remedy for Excessive Deployment of Battlefield Technology in Search Warrant 
Execution, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 109, 128 (2016) (promoting the 
requirement that SWAT deployment be through magistrate approval). 
 39. See Holland, 268 F.3d at 1183 (discussing a case in Colorado in which a 
search warrant was obtained but the Sheriff decided to use a SWAT team); Smith 
v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the police in 
Pennsylvania instigated the SWAT involvement).  
 40. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-210 (LexisNexis 2016) (exemplifying 
state statutes prohibiting no-knock forced entries without a warrant unless 
certain specified exigencies exist). 
 41. Infra Section IV.A. (“Judicial Approval of SWAT Deployments”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Infra Section IV.B.. (“Centralizing Control over SWAT”). 
 44. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & NAT’L TACTICAL OFFICERS ASS’N, 
NATIONAL SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) STUDY: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL TRENDS AND ISSUES FROM 2009 TO 2013 8 (2013), 
[hereinafter SWAT STUDY] https://ntoa.org/ntoa-swat-study (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 45. See id. at 9 (discussing that 89.9% of agencies have SWAT members on 
a part-time basis). 
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state and federal levels, SWAT units will have the opportunity to 
train fully for the mission that SWAT is best suited to. 
II. Procedural Justice and the Language and Equipment of War 
Two seemingly contradictory movements began or gained 
momentum in the 1970s and have continued to today. The first 
movement was the creation and proliferation of SWAT units. As 
early as 1967 a formal SWAT unit was part of the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD)46 and since then the number of SWAT 
units nationwide have increased exponentially.47 The second 
movement was pioneered by a social psychologist and a law 
professor who co-authored the influential book Procedural Justice: 
A Psychological Analysis in 1975.48 The book examined the critical 
societal questions of what procedures are used by individuals and 
groups to resolve conflicts and why.49 From this work has come 
research that has asked why individuals and groups follow the 
law.50 Several studies have suggested that procedural justice plays 
an important role in an individual’s willingness to follow the law.51 
Central to whether individuals believe procedural justice exists is 
the degree to which they believe a process is fair, neutral, and 
permits them a voice in the resolution of the conflict.52 This theory 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1789 (“The first SWAT unit was formed in 
1967 by Los Angeles Police Inspector Daryl Gates . . . .”). 
 47. See id. (“Between 1980 and 2000, there was a 1400% increase in SWAT 
deployments.”). But see The Rise of SWAT Teams, PBS: INDEP. LENS, 
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/videos/the-rise-of-swat-teams/ (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2016) (saying that SWAT has increased 15,000% from the late 1970s to 
today) (on file with author). 
 48. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 49. Id. at 1.  
 50. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990) (introducing the 
various perspectives on reasons why people choose to obey the law). 
 51. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 29, at 3 (looking at “justice judgments 
based on norms of social process.”); TYLER & BLADER, supra note 29, at 142 
(“[M]embers react strongly to the message about quality of treatment that is 
contained within formal rules and procedures, there would seem to be much for 
groups to gain by developing the type of statements of rights and entitlements 
that characterize the law.”); TYLER, supra note 50, at 12 (“[S]eeking to understand 
the factors shaping cooperation with law and legal authorities.”).  
 52. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 128 (discussing in depth the three factors 
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of why individuals follow the law has been one of the arguments 
favoring the movement to community policing.53 The focus of this 
section is on explaining the core components of procedural justice, 
the rise of SWAT, some common equipment and tactics of SWAT 
units, and the impact of SWAT means and methods on procedural 
justice.54  
A. Procedural Justice 
The term procedural justice is a relatively new expression. It 
was popularized in the 1970s in the work of two professors entitled 
Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis.55 In it, Professor 
Thibaut and Professor Walker examined the methods and 
procedures that are used to resolve conflicts between individuals 
and groups.56 They arrived at the conclusion that “the main finding 
of the body of our research, . . . [is] that for litigation the class of 
procedures commonly called ‘adversarial’ is clearly superior.”57 The 
author’s theorized that at least part of why individuals favored the 
adversarial process was the high degree of control individuals had 
in the process.58 
The work of Professors Thibaut and Walker has been 
expanded and further developed by a number of researchers, but 
of particular note is Law Professor Tom Tyler. Professor Tyler has 
authored and co-authored several books and articles on different 
                                                                                                     
affecting whether individuals believe procedural justice exists). 
 53. See Rachel Martin, Procedural Justice: Taking The Ego Out of Policing, 
NPR (June 7, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/07/412633564/procedural-
justice-taking-the-ego-out-of-policing (describing Oakland, California’s efforts to 
build trust between police and the community) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A NEW ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADERSHIP, 1 
(Craig Fischer ed. 2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_ 
Online_Documents/Leadership/legitimacy%20and%20procedural%20justice%20-
%20a%20new%20element%20of%20police%20leadership.pdf (reporting that 
individuals view police with more legitimacy in a system of community policing). 
 54. Infra Section II.A (“Procedural Justice”). 
 55. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 48, at 13–14, 117–24 (looking at 
fairness and control). 
 56. See id. at 72–77 (noting adversarial and inquisitorial procedures). 
 57. Id. at 118. 
 58. Id. at 119. 
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aspects of procedural justice.59 In his book Why People Obey the 
Law, Professor Tyler focuses particularly on the connections 
between procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance.60 Through 
empirical research, Professor Tyler asserts a connection between 
individuals’ sense of whether police were providing procedural 
justice and whether they believed the police authority was 
legitimate.61 This question is not merely a matter of whether the 
public thinks favorably about the police. Professor Tyler asserts 
that those who felt police were not legitimate were less likely to 
comply with police direction or aid police in general.62 Thus, where 
there is a sense of procedural justice, there is more compliance with 
the law and compliance with law officers. 
The work of Professor Tyler and others also revealed factors 
that were linked to whether individuals felt they had received 
procedural justice.63 Significant to a sense of procedural justice, 
found in both Professor Tyler and Professors Thibaut and Walker’s 
work, was the degree of control individuals were able to bring to 
bear on the situation.64 Professor Tyler found that control over 
process was an important factor in determining whether 
individuals felt they had received procedural justice—and a 
powerful factor in whether an individual felt they had process 
control was whether individuals felt that what they were saying 
had been considered in resolving a situation.65 Other factors that 
were considered and found to have an influence on an individual’s 
sense of procedural justice were: whether their experiences with 
police were consistent; whether the officials were impartial; was 
the decision of the official accurate or of high quality; was there an 
agency or official individuals could complain to; was the official 
polite and concerned with the citizen’s rights; and did the official 
                                                                                                     
 59. See generally sources cited supra note 29; TYLER, supra note 50 
(introducing the various perspectives on reasons why people choose to obey the 
law). 
 60. TYLER, supra note 50, at 106. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 31, 33, 58, 108. 
 63. Id. at 125–57. 
 64. See id. at 134 (“[T]he distribution of control when a person is dealing with 
legal authority influences the person’s assessment of whether procedural justice 
has occurred.”). 
 65. Id. at 130. 
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seek to be fair.66 Thus, procedural justice is, as Professor Tyler 
wrote, “complex and multifaceted.”67  
Some of the factors affecting procedural justice are out of the 
hands of police—for example, an individual’s sense of consistency, 
which builds off of past knowledge and experience, is out of police 
hands.68 Also, whether there is “correctability,” which asks 
whether there is an agency or individual a citizen can complain to 
and whether such a complaint will matter, is not controlled by 
police on the scene.69 However, most factors are within the control 
of officer.70 If an officer is polite, seeks to get all the information 
necessary to making a good decision, gives an individual the 
opportunity to have her say and have her say matter, this 
positively impacts a sense of procedural justice.71  
The importance of procedural justice is even more potentially 
striking when several other aspects are considered. First, as 
mentioned above, procedural justice is linked to legitimacy.72 
Legitimacy is arguably linked to whether individuals feel 
personally committed to following the directions of police or 
assisting police.73 Thus, procedural justice is potentially critical to 
law enforcement. Second, an individual’s sense of whether she or 
her friends and family received procedural justice are powerful 
factors—more important than race—in determining legitimacy.74 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 128–30, 135–37. 
 67. Id. at 137. 
 68. See id. at 10 (“[E]very day experiences with the police . . . influence 
citizens.”). 
 69. Id. at 136. 
 70. See id. at 154 (discussing that the officer can control his behavior, his 
apparent honesty, and overall ethicality of his actions). 
 71. See id. (discussing that, citizens, when they “lack the information needed 
to rely on consistency,” they rely on information directly in front of them—the 
police officer). 
 72. See id. at 31 (“[T]hose who view authority as legitimate are more likely 
to comply with legal authority.”). 
 73. See id. (“[T]hose who view authority as legitimate are more likely to 
comply with legal authority.”); Id. at 56 (discussing that obedience to the law is 
“strongly linked to people’s morality” and that there is a “general feeling” that 
“law breaking is morally wrong.”). 
 74. Id. at 90, 63, 227; see also Jake Horowitz, Making Every Encounter 
Count: Building Trust and Confidence in the Police, 256 NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 8 
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000256c.pdf. 
NIJ recently funded five studies exploring factors that influence satisfaction 
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So attitudes are not set and police have the opportunity to shape 
the public’s perception of them in every interaction they have with 
the public.  
B. SWAT 
The rise of SWAT units in the United States has been well 
documented by numerous sources, but few as comprehensively as 
author Radley Balko in Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization 
of America’s Police Forces.75 Balko discusses the historic resistance 
to the use of the military for policing and the dangers that arise 
when the military is used for domestic policing.76 He also discusses 
the seemingly contradictory willingness to permit the police to 
become more militarized.77 Balko explains how the vision of SWAT 
came together starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s.78  
The belief that police needed an enhanced quasi-military 
capability can be traced to a number of events in the 1960s, but 
two incidents—the Watts Riots and the University of Texas bell 
tower shooting—are particularly illustrative.79  
                                                                                                     
with the police. The research suggests that satisfaction is shaped by 
demographic variables, neighborhood crime conditions, and experiences 
with the police—whether first hand or indirect. Race was not found to 
directly determine level of satisfaction. Instead, researchers concluded that 
race, due to its correlation with other demographic variables, neighborhood 
crime rates, and experiences with police, was an indirect influence on the 
level of satisfaction with the police. 
Id. 
 75. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013) (tracing the growth of the American police force 
with an emphasis on the period from 1960 to the 2000s); see also generally PETER 
B. KRASKA, MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE, 1–13 (2001).  
 76. BALKO, supra note 75, at 11–26, 35–40. 
 77. Id. at 43–80.  
 78. Id. at 43–137. 
 79. See DAVID A. KLINGER & JEFF ROJEK, A MULTI-METHOD STUDY OF SPECIAL 
WEAPONS & TACTICS TEAMS 1 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/223855.pdf (explaining how these events demonstrated the ineffectiveness 
of local police forces, which led to further development of SWAT forces in the 
1960s). 
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In the summer of 1965, the county of Watts, a part of the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area, exploded in six days of rioting.80 The 
riots caused thirty-four deaths, over one thousand injuries, more 
than three thousand arrests, and approximately forty million 
dollars of property damage.81 It also exposed deep anger among 
members of the African American community in the county of 
Watts and the police’s inability to maintain law and order when 
faced with a large scale riot.82  
In 1966 Charles Whitman killed eleven people and wounded 
over thirty others by firing a number of hunting rifles from the top 
of a bell tower in Austin, Texas.83 After killing his mother and wife, 
Whitman barricaded himself in the bell tower on the campus of the 
University of Texas.84 The tower was approximately 230 feet 
high.85 When Austin police attempted to return fire on Whitman, 
their weapons did not have the range to hit him.86  
These two events illustrated two common arguments for 
SWAT units. First, there are some circumstances involving 
widespread civil unrest which normal police units are incapable of 
effectively responding.87 Second, there are occasions where 
criminals will be more heavily armed than the average officer.88 
The Watts Riot was only one of several in the 1960s.89 Riots in 
Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, also caused 
numerous deaths and millions of dollars in property damage.90 In 
                                                                                                     
 80. Watts Riots, NPR, http://www.pbs.org/hueypnewton/times/times_watts. 
html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 81. Id. 
 82. BALKO, supra note 75, at 51–53. 
 83. Id. at 56–58. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See KLINGER & ROJEK, supra note 79 (describing that certain violent 
episodes can “easily outstrip the capacity” of normal law enforcement officers). 
 88. See id. (applying the same line of reasoning for weapons as well). 
 89. Urban Decay in the 1960’s, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/johngardner/ 
chapters/5b.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Urban Decay] (on file 
with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 90. See Virginia Postrel, The Consequences of the 1960’s Race Riots Come 
into View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/30/ 
business/the-consequences-of-the-1960s-race-riots-come-into-view.html?_r=0 
(last updated Jan. 3, 2005) (saying that in Detroit alone there was about $50 
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Watts, Detroit, and Newark, National Guard troops had to be 
called to put an end to the riots.91 In 1967–68 police forces in 
California, Florida, and New Jersey took steps toward a more 
militarized police force.92 
What started with a few major metropolitan police forces in 
the late 1960s has now evolved into virtually every major police 
force (those serving over 50,000 residents) having its own SWAT.93 
Many other smaller police forces also have their own SWAT 
units.94 Additionally, federal agencies, some not even involved in 
law enforcement—like the Department of Agriculture, or the 
Tennessee Valley Authority—have been alleged to have SWAT-
like units.95  
                                                                                                     
million in property damage) (on file with author); Newark Riot (1967), 
BLACKPAST.ORG, http://www.blackpast.org/aah/newark-riot-1967 (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2016) (“Property damage exceeded $10 million”) (on file with author); see 
also Glenn C. Frese, The Riot Curfew, 57 CAL. L. REV. 450, 450 (1969) (analyzing 
the constitutionality of riot curfews).  
 91. See BALKO, supra note 75, at 42 (“By the 1960s, the civil rights, 
counterculture, and antiwar movements would be in full swing, leading the 
government to call repeatedly on the National Guard and occasionally on US 
troops to keep order in urban areas.”). 
 92. Id. at 62. 
 93. See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law 
Enforcement: Hearing on D927 Before the Subcomm. On Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 1–8 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony 
of Peter Kraska, Professor, School of Justice Studies, University of Eastern 
Kentucky) http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/oversight-of-federal-programs-
for-equipping-state-and-local-law-enforcement (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
As of the late 1990s, 89 percent of American police departments serving 
populations of fifty thousand people or more had a PPU, almost double 
of what existed in the mid-1980s. Their growth in smaller jurisdictions 
(agencies serving between 25 and 50,000 people) was even more 
pronounced. Currently, about 80 percent of small town agencies have 
a PPU; in the mid-1980s only 20 percent had them. 
Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See John Fund, The United States of SWAT?, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 14, 2014, 
4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/376053/united-states-swat-
john-fund (“Dozens of federal agencies now have Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) teams to further an expanding definition of their missions . . . the 
Department of Agriculture, the Railroad Retirement Board . . . . [all] of these 
have their own SWAT units and are part of a worrying trend towards the 
militarization of federal agencies . . . .”) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). But see Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Rand Paul’s 
Grand, Inaccurate Retelling of ‘Federal SWAT Team” Raids, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 
150 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 135 (2016) 
Most researchers who have studied the rise of SWAT units 
have connected their proliferation with the war on drugs.96 At 
roughly the same time as many major cities were considering 
SWAT units,97 Richard Nixon was ramping up his anti-drug 
initiative.98 In June 1971, President Nixon addressed Congress 
about the drug problem in the United States, asking for 
substantial funding to fight the threat posed by illegal drugs.99 In 
his address, President Nixon famously declared that drugs were 
“public enemy number one” and “in order to fight and defeat this 
enemy it is necessary to wage a new all-out offense.”100 Nixon went 
further, and as part of that offense the Drug Enforcement Agency 
                                                                                                     
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/ 2015/09/01/rand-
pauls-grand-inaccurate-retelling-of-federal-swat-team-raids/ (discussing that 
Steve Lenkart, Executive Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers 
Association, said that the only federal agency that has an actual SWAT team is 
the FBI) (on file with author).  
 96. See Hearing, supra note 93 (detailing the correlation between the war on 
drugs and the quasi-militarization of police forces); KRASKA supra note 75, at 7 
(same); BALKO, supra note 75, at 125 (same); Cadman Robb Kiker III, From 
Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization of American Policing Equipment, 
Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 282, 286–87 (2015) (“The 
number of specialty police units—and the frequency of their use—expanded in 
the 1980s to meet the needs of the war on drugs. Today, seventy-nine percent of 
SWAT team deployments are used for execution of a warrant, most commonly in 
drug investigations.”); Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing 
American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. 
PROBS. 1, 9 (1997) (discussing how the war on drugs has been transformed into 
“tangible militarized action” and an increase in police paramilitary units). See 
generally David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers be Peace Officers? 
The Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 
AKRON L. REV. 619, 651–53 (1997).  
 97. See Richard Fairburn, Police Militarization and the Evolution of SWAT: 
Requiring a Minimum Police Population of 100 Officers to Establish a SWAT 
Team Helps to Keep Standards High and Overuse Low, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 13, 
2013), https://www.policeone.com/swat/articles/6384874-Police-militarization-
and-the-evolution-of-SWAT/ (noting that in the 1970s only major cities could elect 
to have SWAT units) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 98. BALKO, supra note 75, at 125. 
 99. See Richard Nixon, Former U.S. President, Address to Congress (June 
17, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 (addressing the issue of 
increasing incidents of death caused by narcotics and declaring a war on drugs) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 100. Id. 
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was created in 1973.101 The war continued after President Nixon’s 
resignation.102  
Over the course of the next forty plus years, the growth of 
SWAT could be described as a tale of incentive and consequence. 
Money was funneled to both federal and state law enforcement 
agencies to support the war on drugs.103 More and more of that 
money was used to fund SWAT teams and to use them in anti-drug 
actions.104 Laws were passed that permitted local law enforcement 
and state governments to receive funding through drug civil 
forfeiture actions.105 Finally, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
a new funding source was created for SWAT units through the 
Department of Homeland Security.106 By 2010, the Department of 
Homeland Security—an organization that only came into existence 
                                                                                                     
 101. See DEA History, DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, https://www.dea.gov/ 
about/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (outlining the history of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency and explaining Nixon’s establishment of the DEA through a 
July 1973 Executive Order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 102. See id. (“Today, the DEA has nearly 5,000 special agents and a budget of 
$2.03 billion.”). 
 103. See Radley Balko, How did America’s Police Become a Military Force on 
the Streets, ABA J. (July 1, 2013, 10:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/how_did_americas_police_become_a_military_force_on_the_streets 
(noting how the Byrne Formula Grant Program provided greater money for drug 
related law enforcement activity) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 104. See id. (noting the disparity in funding between other units, such as the 
sex crime unit, and SWAT and drug units, with one officer stating, “‘the SWAT 
team, the drug guys, they always [have] money.’”). 
 105. See Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Steven Rich, D.C. Police Plan for Future 




(explaining the plans D.C. police made in anticipation of “proceeds from future 
civil seizures of cash and property” resulting from drug seizures) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also DEP’T OF 
JUST. GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE & LOCAL L. ENF’T AGENCIES (Apr. 
2009), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794 696/download (noting in 
the foreword that as of 2009, “the Department of Justice has shared over $4.5 
billion in forfeited assets with more than 8,000 state and local law enforcement 
agencies.”).  
 106. Fund, supra note 95. 
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in November 2002—had given out 34 billion dollars in anti-terror 
grants.107  
Today it is estimated that 90% of large city (over 50,000 
citizens) and 80% of small city (25,000–50,000) police forces in the 
United States have SWAT units.108 In 2014, one of the leading 
experts on SWAT in the United States testified before a Senate 
Subcommittee that, conservatively, 60,000 SWAT deployments 
occur every year.109 According to a study conducted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, of the SWAT deployments in the 
United States, approximately 62% were to execute search 
warrants related to drugs110 and, of those deployments, SWAT 
used dynamic entry techniques over half the time.111 Beyond drug 
searches, SWAT units have been used to “patrol” high crime 
neighborhoods (in full SWAT battle gear) to make INS detentions, 
and in at least one instance, to allegedly break up an unauthorized 
barber shop.112  
                                                                                                     
 107. SHAWN REESE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40246, DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO STATES AND LOCALITIES: A SUMMARY AND 
ISSUES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS 20 (2009). 
 108. See The Rise of SWAT: Sources, PBS (Mar. 16, 2016), http://ww 
w.pbs.org/independentlens/content/the-rise-of-swat-sources./ (listing SWAT 
statistics pulled from a variety of sources) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 109. Hearing, supra note 93. But see PBS, supra note 108 (listing varying 
statistics). 
 110. See ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 25, at 31 (explaining that the 
primary use of SWAT teams has shifted from dealing with hostage or barricade 
situations to responding to execute search warrants in drug investigations). 
 111. Id; see Balko, supra note 20 (noting over half of SWAT actions were in 
private homes and used some form of forced entry) (on file with author). 
 112. See Radley Balko, Federal appeals court: Stop using SWAT-style raids 
for regulatory inspections, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2014), 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/19/federal-appeals-court-
stop-using-swat-style-raids-for-regulatory-inspections (describing the increased 
choice of regulatory agencies and police departments to deploy increased police 
force to enforce seemingly minor offenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Cops or Soldiers?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 
22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21599349-americas-
police-have-become-too-militarised-cops-or-soldiers (describing that “some cities 
use [SWAT] for routine patrols in high-crime areas,” and also referencing that a 
SWAT team ended up being used for stopping individuals from “’barbering 
without a license.’”). 
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The growth of SWAT units within the United States,113 
coupled with the use of SWAT units for more diverse policing,114 
means SWAT teams have—and will—come into more contact with 
citizens. 
C. SWAT Tactics and Techniques 
With SWAT deployments as frequent as described above,115 it 
is important to identify how SWAT teams operate differently than 
the usual police team. These distinctions include a specialized 
mission,116 tactics,117 equipment,118 and uniforms.119 Each of these 
distinctions are important to understanding how the increasing 
use of SWAT impacts the broader question of the public’s 
perception of police legitimacy.120 
1. Mission 
The SWAT mission is intended to be unique when compared 
to other policing. This can be seen when comparing the definition 
of SWAT provided by the National Tactical Officers Association121 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1789 (“Between 1980 and 2000, there was 
a 1400% increase in SWAT deployments.”). But see The Rise of SWAT Teams, 
supra note 47 (saying that SWAT has increased 15,000% from the late 1970s to 
today) (on file with author). 
 114. See id. (describing that this expansion has “increased primarily in 
response to the ‘wars’ on drugs and terrorism.”). 
 115. Supra Section II.B. 
 116. Infra Section II.C.1. 
 117. Infra Section II.C.3. 
 118. Infra Section II.C.2.b. 
 119. Infra Section II.C.2.a. 
 120. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 38 (discussing police legitimacy pursuant to 
an individual’s obedience to the law). 
 121. NAT’L TACTICAL OFFICERS ASS’N, SWAT STANDARDS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2008), https://ntoa.org/massemail/swatstandards.pdf 
[hereinafter NTOA] (“[A] designated law enforcement team whose members are 
recruited, selected, trained, equipped and assigned to resolve critical incidents 
involving threat to public safety which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of 
traditional law enforcement first responders and/or investigative units”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
154 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 135 (2016) 
to the mission statements of the Boston,122 Los Angeles,123 New 
York City,124 and Dallas125 police departments.  
The mission statements for Boston, Los Angeles, New York 
City, and Dallas police departments include a commitment to 
creating a safer environment and working in partnership with the 
community.126 The above mission statements often include a 
promise to treat citizens with respect.127 Implicit in each statement 
is an assumption that citizens are the constituents or if the police 
department were a business, the citizens are the customers.128  
                                                                                                     
 122. Mission Statement, BOSTON POLICE DEP’T, http://bpdnews.com/mission-
and-objectives/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Boston Mission Statement] 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 123. Mission Statement, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapd 
online.org/inside_the_lapd (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Los Angeles 
Mission Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice).  
 124. Mission, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) 
[hereinafter New York Mission Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 125. Mission Statement, DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, http://www.dallaspolice.net/ 
abouts/missionstatement (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Dallas Mission 
Statement] (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice).  
 126. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (indicating a commitment 
to community safety through their mission statement); Los Angeles Mission 
Statement, supra note 123; (outlining the goals of the Los Angeles Police 
Department and their commitment to safety); New York Mission Statement, supra 
note 124 (“The mission of the New York City Police Department is to enhance the 
quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with the community to 
enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain order.”); Dallas 
Mission Statement, supra note 125 (outlining the goals of the police department 
to serve the people of Dallas, including methods of community cooperation). 
 127. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (“[W]orking in partnership 
with the community . . . .”); Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123 
(“[C]onducting ourselves with the highest ethical standard to maintain public 
confidence.”); New York Mission Statement, supra note 124 (“The department is 
committed to accomplishing its mission . . . by treating every citizen 
with . . . respect . . . .”); Dallas Mission Statement, supra note 125 (“Dallas Police 
Department will conduct themselves in an ethical manner. They will respect and 
protect the rights of citizens as determined by law . . . .”). 
 128. See Boston Mission Statement, supra note 122 (“[W]orking in partnership 
with the community . . . .”); Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123 
(emphasizing that police will “work with” the communities); New York Mission 
Statement, supra note 124 (“[W]orking in partnership with the community . . . .”); 
Dallas Mission Statement, supra note 125 (“[G]oal is to help people and provide 
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SWAT mission statements are harder to come by—of the four 
police departments mentioned above, only the Los Angeles Police 
Department had a mission statement on its webpage for the Metro 
Division that includes the LAPD SWAT unit.129 The mission 
statement echoes the LAPD commitment to “community 
policing,”130 but suggests SWAT will assist in achieving effective 
community policing by reducing the public’s fear of crime.131 The 
Metro Division describes itself in the following way: 
Today, the primary responsibility of Metro is to provide support 
to the Department’s community-based policing efforts by 
deploying additional crime suppression resources throughout 
the City. Assignments include uniformed crime suppression 
details, as well as responding to high-risk barricaded situations, 
stakeouts, security details, warrant service, and assisting 
investigators in solving major crimes.132 
The National Tactical Officers Association describes the 
purpose of SWAT as the following: 
The primary characteristic of SWAT that distinguishes it from 
other units is the focus of effort. SWAT teams are focused on 
tactical solutions, as opposed to other functions, such as 
investigation. The purpose of SWAT is to increase the likelihood 
of safely resolving critical incidents.133 
What appears to be a key difference between the police and the 
SWAT mindset/mission is the SWAT assumption that there is a 
“critical incident” or “high risk” situation. Thus, when a SWAT 
officer is deployed someone has already determined that the target 
                                                                                                     
assistance at every opportunity.”). 
 129. See Metropolitan Division, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP’T, http://www. 
lapdonline.org/metropolitan_division (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter LA 
Metro Mission Statement] (“Since 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) has provided a ready response to 
situations that were beyond the capabilities of normally equipped and trained 
Department personnel”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice).  
 130. Los Angeles Mission Statement, supra note 123. 
 131. LA Metro Mission Statement, supra note 129.  
 132. Id.  
 133. See NTOA, supra note 121 (outlining the tactical response and operation 
standards for the organization’s member agencies, including concepts to 
standardize tactical law enforcement services).  
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of the investigation is at least dangerous and probably guilty.134 
This is distinct from the broader policing mission, which seems to 
assume the individuals police encounter are the very people they 
are intended to protect.135 
2. SWAT Appearance 
The SWAT mindset described above permeates every aspect of 
a SWAT team, as surely as form follows function. This is reflected 
as much in a SWAT officer’s appearance as in any other aspect. 
The SWAT uniform is not a standard police uniform. Nor is SWAT 
equipment the same as the standard equipment of a police officer. 
Finally, things as simple as haircuts and eye wear mark the 
distinction between the SWAT officer and the beat cop. 
a. Uniforms 
Although police uniforms can vary widely, most include a 
nearly business-like appearance. Officers often wear a dark blue 
trouser and shirt.136 The color blue is so often chosen that police 
are sometimes referred to as “the boys in blue”137 and it is often 
said that police officers bleed blue.138 The shirt is usually button 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19 (describing that SWAT are supposed 
to be used for “high-risk situations, such as terrorist attacks and hostage crises,” 
and, recently, risk search warrants that may yield dangerous consequences to 
police). 
 135. Compare NTOA, supra note 121 (“SWAT teams are focused on tactical 
solutions . . . . [And] resolving critical incidents”), with New York Mission 
Statement, supra note 124 (“The mission of the New York City Police Department 
is to enhance the quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with 
the community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain 
order.”). 
 136. Aarian Marshal, A History of Police Uniforms—and Why They Matter 
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2014/08/a-history-of-police-
uniforms and-why-they-matter/378660/ (on file with author).  
 137. See Boys in Blue, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2016) (“A humorous 
name for the police.”).  
 138. The term “bleeding blue” is used as a term of solidarity to police and what 
they do. If an officer is told he, or she, “bleeds blue” it means they are deemed to 
have significant respect for not only their duty as public officers, but other police 
officers as well. See generally NR Staff, Bleeding Blue: Honoring our Police, NAT’L 
REV. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/ corner/424449/bleeding-
WHEN MORE IS LESS 157 
down with two breast pockets, a collar, and, depending on the 
weather, either long or short sleeves.139 Virtually all police officers 
wear a name tape on their uniform shirt above one of the breast 
pockets.140 The shirt and pants are capable of being pressed and 
often are.141 Many officers wear a tie and business style shoes.142 
Some officers wear a hat which looks much like a military dress 
uniform hat, circular with a leather brim.143 
The SWAT uniform is usually some derivative of the military 
“battle dress uniform” (BDU).144 The uniform includes baggy pants 
with large cargo pockets at the thighs and normal pockets higher 
up. The BDU blouse is also baggy, button down, with cargo pockets 
at the breast and below. SWAT officers sometimes do not have 
name tapes on their BDU blouse. SWAT officers usually wear boots 
rather than shoes.145 Some SWAT officers also wear a balaclava, 
                                                                                                     
blue-honoring-our-police-video (on file with author); Women ‘Bleed Blue’ in 
Support of Fallen Police Officer, WBTV.COM, http://www. 
wbtv.com/story/20377555/women-bleed-blue-in-support-of-fallen-police-officer 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with author).  
 139. See Richard R. Johnson, The Psychological Influence of the Police 
Uniform, POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 4, 2005), https://www.policeone.com/police-
products/ apparel/undergear/articles/99417-The-psychological-influence-of-the-
police-uni form/ (describing typical police attire) (on file with author); see also 
Uniform Regulations, PEORIA POLICE DEP’T 512 (July 8, 2013), 
https://www.peoriaaz.gov/uploadedfiles/newpeoriaaz/city_departments/police_de
partment/administration/policies/policy_1046_uniform_regulations.pdf 
(describing the purpose and the use of having such regulations) (on file with 
author); Personal Appearance, Uniform/Citizen’s Dress and Equipment, CHI. 
POLICE DEP’T 3–5 (Oct. 26, 2016), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/ 
data/a7a57b9b-1562d157-70d15-62d1-a0e04429f1379599.pdf?hl=true (describing 
the uniform specifications and appearance requirements) (on file with author); 
Uniforms and Equipment, PHILA. POLICE DEP’T 2–9 (Apr. 15, 2011), 
https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/D6.7-UniformsAndEquipment.pdf 
(last updated Sept. 11, 2014) (describing the prescribed uniform) (on file with 
author).  
 140. See generally sources cited supra note 139. 
   141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. See BDU–Battle Dress Uniforms, FAS: MIL. ANALYSIS NETWORK, 
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/bdu.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) 
(describing that BDU’s are military, combat uniforms “not intended to be worn as 
all-purpose uniforms.”). 
 145. See FBI SWAT Graphic, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING (Nov. 19, 2010), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/capabilities/fbi-swat-graphic [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTING] (discussing SWAT gear) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
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which is headgear that covers the entire head, neck, and face of the 
officer, often leaving only the eyes uncovered.146 One author 
referred to the SWAT balaclava as a “ninja style hood.”147 Finally, 
SWAT officers wear Kevlar helmets—the most common of these 
are either similar or identical to the helmets worn by United States 
service members during military exercises or in combat zones.  
b. Equipment 
A police officer’s standard equipment usually includes a 
personal radio, a pistol, pen and paper, handcuffs, a flashlight, a 
baton of some sort (there are a number of different size and 
configurations), a cargo belt, and sometimes pepper spray or a 
Taser.148 Although the above list seems substantial, much of the 
tools of force (for example, pistol, baton, handcuffs, Taser, pepper 
spray) are often partially concealed in the cargo belt of the officer. 
Some older style holsters that clip to the cargo belt cover the top of 
the pistol handle. Even the officer’s radio is usually attached to the 
belt with a hand set sometimes attached at the officer’s shoulder. 
This arrangement allows the officer to have his or her hands free. 
With hands free, and weapons partially concealed and stowed, the 
officer can appear less threatening and is able to use her hands to 
communicate. 
An individual SWAT officer’s equipment, as described on the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations webpage, is substantial.149 
                                                                                                     
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 146. See Pat Novesky, A Simple Cold Weather Survival Kit for Cops, 
POLICEONE (Feb. 8, 2011), https://www.policeone.com/Officer-Safety/ 
articles/3329798-A-simple-cold-weather-survival-kit-for-cops/ (stating that police 
balaclava covers most of an officer’s face) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); LAPG: LA POLICE GEAR, 
http://www.lapolicegear.com/balaclavas.html (providing visual examples of 
balaclavas) (on file with author). 
 147. JIM FISHER, SWAT MADNESS AND THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN 
POLICE: A NATIONAL DILEMMA 13 (2010). 
 148. See generally OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER 
REGARDING SAFETY EQUIPMENT (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www2.oaklandnet. 
com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oak057728.pdf [hereinafter 
OAKLAND POLICE EQUIPMENT] (examining the police equipment required for the 
Oakland police department as an example) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 149. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145 (describing how an 
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Described on the webpage are the following standard equipment: 
Kevlar helmet, goggles, bullet proof vest with modular lightweight 
equipment weave, pouches for additional magazines of 
ammunition, MP5 submachine gun with 30-round clip, medic pack 
and flex handcuffs, waist belt with thigh harness for a pistol, pistol 
(FBI recommended .45 caliber with 8 round capacity), gloves, knee 
pads, gas mask, and additional tools for breaching (could include, 
collapsible sledge hammer, modified crow bar, and battering 
ram).150 When observing the FBI SWAT officer in full personal 
equipment, images of dystopic fiction come to mind.151 The officer’s 
eyes are completely obscured by the goggles which, as depicted on 
the FBI webpage, are tinted.152 Virtually all of the officer’s body is 
concealed.153 The officer has two weapons loaded with 38 rounds of 
ammunition in magazines and the capacity for much more 
ammunition and extra magazines in pouches attached to the 
officer’s bullet proof vest.154 The officer is wearing a military style 
Kevlar helmet and bullet proof vest with groin protection, giving 
the unmistakable appearance of a soldier in a combat situation.155 
3. Tactics 
The tactics employed by police officers on a day in, day out 
basis are as varied as the circumstances the police encounter. 
However, because the focus of this article is on the impact of SWAT 
means and methods, and the majority of SWAT deployments are 
for the execution of search warrants,156 the techniques used by 
                                                                                                     
assaulter may be outfitted for a mission). 
 150. See id. (outlining and illustrating the standard equipment used by SWAT 
officers). 
 151. See generally EQUILIBRIUM (Dimension Films & Blue Tulip Productions 
2002); ULTRAVIOLET (Screen Gems & Ultravi Productions 2006) (showing specific 
examples of police in movies). 
 152. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145 (displaying a visual of 
SWAT goggles and describing their capacity to withstand blasts and stop debris).  
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (explaining the amount of ammunition a SWAT officer carries for 
a mission). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19. 
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police or SWAT during the execution of a search warrant will be 
the focus of this discussion of tactics. 
a. Police 
The manner in which police execute a search warrant is 
significantly impacted by the circumstances.157 But an officer’s 
default position is important. By way of example this article will 
use the standard operating procedures (SOP) for executing search 
warrants employed by the Fairfax County, Virginia Police 
Department.158 After the officer in charge of the search has 
reviewed all the information relevant to the search (site 
characteristics, items to be searched for, individuals likely to be 
present during the search, etc.)159 and positioned his search 
team,160 he or she shall:  
[N]otify persons inside the search site of the team's presence, 
and shall announce, in a voice loud enough to be heard inside 
the search site, that they are the Fairfax County Police and they 
have a warrant to search the premises and they demand 
admission to the premises at once.161 
According to the SOP, after notification officers should wait at 
least twenty to sixty seconds before entering the place to be 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255–58 (1979) (discussing that 
a police officer’s actions are subject to the standard of reasonability under the 
circumstances). 
 158. See FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS AND 
GENERAL ORDERS VOLUME I —ADMINISTRATION, https://docs.google.com/viewer? 
url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fairfaxcounty.gov%2Fpolice%2Finside-fcpd%2Fpdf% 
2Fgeneralordersvolumeiprint.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (explaining the 
responsibilities and standards of the Fairfax County Police Department) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 159. See FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS AND 
GENERAL ORDERS VOLUME II—OPERATIONS, 463–72, http:/www. 
fairfaxcounty.gov/police/inside-fcpd/pdf/generalordersvolumeiiprint.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2016) (discussing the Fairfax County Police Department’s search 
warrant procedures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 160. See id. at 467 (discussing where the Fairfax County Police Department 
should position itself in various situations).  
 161. Id. at 467–68. 
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searched.162 The guide further notes that “[w]henever possible, 
premises shall be entered in a courteous and non-destructive 
manner. No force shall be initiated unless resistance is made by a 
person in the premises, or factors identified in Section V, D, are 
present.”163 Finally, the SOP notes that persons at the search 
location are to “be treated with as much restraint and courtesy as 
possible under the circumstances”164 and police may not arrest, 
search, or frisk persons present merely because they are 
present.165 The SOP does note that persons present during a search 
may have their movement restricted, and the United States 
Supreme Court has held that individuals present during a search 
authorized by a warrant may be detained until the search is 
completed.166 
b. SWAT 
The police search protocols described above are significantly 
different from the SWAT methods commonly employed. Although 
SWAT teams do not possess any greater legal authority than police 
when executing a search warrant, because SWAT has been chosen, 
someone—usually through the use of a threat matrix—has 
concluded there is an enhanced risk.167 Thus, SWAT deployments 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 468. 
 163. See id. (noting the factors incorporated by reference as including “[f]irm 
indication that an occupant of the premises is armed . . . information that an 
occupant has a history of violence .  . knowledge that an occupant would intend to 
frustrate searches . . . [and] knowledge that some occupants would be 
endangered.”). 
 164. Id. at 470. 
 165. Id. at 470–71. 
 166. Id. at 470. See generally Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). 
 167. See Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), CITY OF TUCSON, 
https://www.tucsonaz.gov/police/swat (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) [hereinafter CITY 
OF TUCSON] (“S.W.A.T. Team is to provide the department with the capability to 
safely resolve high-risk situations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see, e.g., Jack Ryan, Special Operations, GEO. 
U. L. CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 10 (Apr. 17, 2008) (“Risk assessment is based 
on facts and circumstances stated in the affidavit for the arrest or search warrant, 
knowledge of the target location and the criminal history of the suspect(s). A copy 
of the warrant should be attached to the Risk Assessment Matrix.”). 
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begin with a conclusion that the usual rules that apply to executing 
a search warrant do not apply. 
SWAT teams use several methods to enter a home. Two 
common methods include: dynamic entry and deliberate entry.168 
Dynamic entries have been considered the primary method of 
entering and have been described in some detail earlier in this 
Article so it will not be rehashed here.169  
Deliberate entry has some of the same characteristics as a 
dynamic entry, but does not have the same “blitzkrieg” 
approach.170 A deliberate entry focuses on a slow, methodical 
application of force.171 During such an entry, the target is breached 
but not in a rush.172 Police secure an entry point and then use 
mirrors and a slow deployment of officers to move from room to 
room.173 Rather than every officer shouting orders, a single officer 
with an amplifier announces the police’s presence and gives orders 
to the individuals inside the target house.174 
D. Procedural Justice/SWAT Conflict 
A significant number of elements important to procedural 
justice are clearly at odds with SWAT. From mission, to 
appearance, to equipment, to tactics, SWAT is, in some ways, the 
antithesis of procedural justice. As mentioned above, procedural 
justice is impacted by factors that are within the immediate control 
of police as well as factors that are beyond the officer’s influence in 
the moment.175 The focus of this discussion is on those factors 
within police control. 
                                                                                                     
 168. See French, supra note 11 (discussing the two different types of SWAT 
team entrances when responding to a warrant). 
 169. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1817 (describing dynamic entries and how 
integral they are in SWAT tactics). 
 170. French, supra note 11.  
 171. See id. (discussing the advantages and differences between a dynamic 
entry and a deliberate entry). 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. See TYLER, supra note 50, at 154 (discussing that the officer can control 
his behavior, his apparent honesty, and overall ethicality of his actions). 
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Beginning with Professors Thibaut and Walker’s work, 
through Professor Tyler’s, is the observation that having a say 176 
in the resolution of an encounter with police is critical to a 
perception of procedural justice. There is nothing about a SWAT 
deployment that suggests to a citizen or a suspect that they have 
any say in what is occurring.177 
Before discussing tactics, a few words about SWAT 
appearance and equipment is in order. Experts in the field of 
communication have found that communication is at least 50% 
non-verbal—thus we take at least 50% of whatever message we 
receive in a situation from non-verbal ques.178 Simply the 
appearance and the type of equipment that SWAT officers often go 
into the field with are counter to encouraging communication.179 
This is both subtle and overt. Beginning with the SWAT attire, it 
seems clear that a fair degree of consideration is given to the 
uniform an officer wears. The non-SWAT police duty uniform 
conveys approachable professionalism. It sometimes includes 
entirely superfluous components, like a tie. Arguably the sole 
purpose of a tie in a police uniform is to make police seem like any 
other professionals in our society. The battle dress uniform of the 
SWAT marks the wearer as a soldier.180 Soldiers do not seek to 
blend in with civilian society. The military is a distinct, mostly 
closed, subculture within our society.181 Further, where we are 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 116–17 (discussing the impact of not only allowing individuals 
an opportunity to speak, but creating a perception that the officer is considering 
what is being said in resolving the dispute). 
 177. See French, supra note 11 (describing the purpose of SWAT dynamic 
entries is to execute with maximum speed and force); see also Rahall, supra note 
10, at 1826–27 (describing that SWAT entries and deployments resemble that of 
military tactics that induce terrifying effects). 
 178. See generally Fred C. Lunenburg, Louder Than Words: The Hidden 
Power of Nonverbal Communication in the Workplace, 12 INT’L J. SCHOLARLY 
ACAD. INTELL. DIVERSITY 1 (2010).  
 179. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Josh Rothman, America’s New Military Culture, BOSTON.COM (Sept. 
14, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/ 
2011/09/americas_new_mi.html (“Today's military is very different. The link 
between civilian and military culture is gone; instead, the military has a culture 
of its own, to which soldiers eagerly adapt”) (on file with author); see also Thomas 
E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between Military and Society, ATLANTIC (July, 1997), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widen ing-gap-
between-military-and-society/306158/ (“[O]ver the next twenty years the U.S. 
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taught from early in our lives that we can approach a police officer 
for help—no such messaging regarding soldiers/service members 
exists.182  
Aggravating the distinction between a uniform meant to 
convey inclusion versus exclusion, is the equipment of SWAT. The 
combination of Kevlar helmet, tinted goggles, and occasionally, the 
balaclava and gas mask, effectively removes any ability to see the 
eyes or face of a SWAT officer. This obscuring of the officer from 
the neck up cuts off eye contact and facial expressions—two major 
methods of non-verbal communication.183 Next, many SWAT 
officers deploy with two weapons, a rifle and a handgun.184 As 
noted above, police officers normally have just one weapon, a pistol, 
when on patrol.185 The two weapons, one being an assault rifle, 
conveys an extremely aggressive posture. This is exaggerated by 
the fact that, in a deployed setting, the rifles are carried “at the 
ready,” which is to say, in both hands with a finger near the trigger 
of the weapon. Further, even the holster for the pistol is different 
for the SWAT officer.186 Rather than a pistol on an equipment belt, 
the SWAT pistol holster is slung low on the thigh, giving the 
unmistakable appearance of an old west gunslinger.187  
Additionally, the overt (visible on the outside of the shirt) flak 
vest, elbow and knee pads, and pouches of additional ammunition, 
all convey the message of a soldier at war,188 and rarely do people 
feel encouraged to talk with a soldier at war. The collective effect 
of police in military attire is to signal in an immediate way to a 
citizen that this is an emergency police situation that involves the 
potential use of immediate deadly force. 
                                                                                                     
military will revert to a kind of garrison status, largely self-contained and 
increasingly distinct as a society and subculture”) (on file with author). 
 182. See What to Teach Kids About Strangers, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION 
COUNS., http://www.ncpc.org/topics/violent-crime-and-personal-safety/strangers 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (saying that a police officer is a “very recognizable 
safe” stranger whom parents should teach to their children that they are okay to 
trust) (on file with author).  
 183. Lunenburg, supra note 178. 
 184. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145. 
 185. See OAKLAND POLICE EQUIPMENT, supra note 148 (describing the Oakland 
Police Department’s required equipment). 
 186. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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More important than equipment and attire to the discussion 
of SWAT and procedural justice are SWAT tactics. Since most of 
SWAT deployments today are in the context of serving warrants,189 
it will be in that context that this discussion focuses. Neither of the 
two primary methods that SWAT use to execute warrants is 
conducive to communication—the essence of any of these tactics is 
to gain compliance.190 Although neither support or encourage a 
sense of procedural justice—one seems worse than the other. 
Particularly adverse to the core elements that determine whether 
an individual feels they have been treated fairly191 is the dynamic 
entry tactic. In stories in the media and in research, this technique 
is discussed again and again.192 From a communication 
perspective, the dynamic entry is weak in two ways. First, and 
most importantly for procedural justice, there is clearly no 
opportunity for individuals being searched to have input in the 
immediate resolution of events.193 The officers assume the 
occupants of the home are armed and dangerous—they seek to 
“dominate” the home with speed and a degree of violence.194 
Clearly there is no opportunity for the occupants to have input, but 
there is also a reduced degree of communication from the officers 
to the occupants.195 When executing a dynamic entry, often all 
officers entering the home are shouting “Police. Search 
warrant”196—this adds to the dominating and shocking effect of the 
                                                                                                     
 189. Shapiro & Meyer, supra note 19; French, supra note 11. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Tyler, supra note 50, at 128–30, 135–37. 
 192. See generally Rex M. Shannon III, Nightmare on Your Street: Moving 
Towards Justice for Innocent Victims of Wrong-Premises SWAT Raids, 77 Miss. 
L.J. 669 (2007); Jessica M. Weitzman, They Won’t Come Knocking No More: 
Hudson v. Michigan and the Demise of the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 73 Brook. 
L. Rev 1209 (2008); Radley Balko, “Dynamic Entry” Raids are Still Dangerous for 
Cops, Too, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/29/dynamic-entry-raids-are-still-dangerous-for-cops-
too/ (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 193. See FRENCH, supra note 11 (describing how SWAT teams enter the 
premises, go room-to-room “clearing” threats with overwhelming force). 
 194. See id. (stating that “‘Dynamic Entry’ is a tactic where surprise, speed, 
and domination are key.”). 
 195. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1822 (describing incidents where SWAT 
teams accidentally raided innocent homes, and did not realize it was the wrong 
home until after considerable amounts of damage and fear had been dealt). 
 196. See Brian Patrick Schaefer, Knocking on the Door: Police Decision Points 
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entry. With multiple individuals shouting, it can be very difficult 
to hear or understand any one person. Hearing directions from 
police are made worse by the use of smoke or flash bang grenades—
which are used to disorient.197 When smoke is used, officers 
sometimes wear protective gas masks, thus making it even more 
difficult to understand what is being said.198  
Other elements of procedural justice are obviously going to 
suffer in most dynamic entries as well. Whether the officer was 
ethical is one of the seven components Professor Tyler incorporates 
in his discussion of the components of procedural justice.199 Ethics 
in this context includes whether the officer was polite and 
concerned with the rights of the individuals involved.200 Officers 
conducting a dynamic entry clearly are not concerned with 
politeness, but the degree of force used—often including threats 
and sometimes profane language201—makes this tactic 
particularly harmful to a sense of procedural justice. The 
employment of force without regard to actions on the part of the 
occupants—breaking down doors, using grenades, etc.—would also 
call into question the officers’ concern for individual rights.  
III. The Fourth Amendment and SWAT 
When reading accounts of SWAT teams executing search 
warrants by smashing in doors in the middle of the night without 
warning, throwing smoke and flash-bang grenades into a house, 
and then detaining all the residents at the end of a drawn assault 
                                                                                                     
in Executing Search Warrants, 127 U. LOUISVILLE ELECTRONIC THESES 
DISSERTATIONS (2015), 
http://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3029&context=etd 
(describing the scene when officers yell “Police, Search Warrant.”). 
 197. See Rahall, supra note 10, at 1819 (stating that flash-bangs are “intended 
to distract and startle the residents.”). 
 198. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 145. 
 199. TYLER, supra note 50, at 163. 
 200. Id. at 138. 
 201. See Brian S. Batterton, Profanity and the Use of Force, LEGAL LIABILITY 
& RISK MGMT. INST. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_ 
questions/4-feb10.shtml (describing a case when a SWAT team deployed and 
issued profanity-laced commands) (on file with author). 
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rifles,202 the natural question to ask is, how is this legal? What 
protection does the Constitution provide against such police 
action? The answer is some. The potential conflict between SWAT 
means and methods and the protections provided to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment is obvious,203 but the inherently dangerous 
and variable circumstances in which police operate demands 
flexibility in the use of force. Although much of the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence centers on when police 
may conduct a search and for what, several cases also focus on how 
police may search—particularly focusing on how police are 
permitted to enter a home. Should the police unreasonably violate 
a clearly established constitutional right, they are subject to civil 
suit.204 The line of cases the Supreme Court has decided that are 
most relevant to SWAT activity have dealt with the issues 
involving the “knock and announce” rule.  
Since at least 1603, Anglo-American law has contained a 
requirement that when police serve a search warrant they must 
usually knock and announce themselves.205 Further, in most 
circumstances police must give the occupant in the home the 
opportunity to open the door206 before the door is forced open. The 
Fourth Amendment itself is clearly broad enough to capture the 
how of a search, as well as the what and when. The Amendment 
protects:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.207 
                                                                                                     
 202. ACLU, WAR COMES HOME, supra note 25, at 9. 
 203. U.S. CONST.amend. IV. 
 204. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 205. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). 
 206. The opportunity to open the door is somewhat variable. In cases 
involving drugs, police generally must knock and announce themselves and wait 
a “reasonable period of time,” which is not tied to how long it would take to answer 
the door. See United States v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that a reasonable period of time for an officer to wait after knocking on a 
door may depend on the circumstances of the situation).  
 207. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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In Wilson v. Arkansas208 the Supreme Court first announced 
that the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment included 
the “knock and announce” rule.209 Justice Thomas, writing for the 
majority, traced the long history of the doctrine to the Semayne210 
case.211 In Semayne the judge concluded that before breaking down 
a door to serve a warrant, a sheriff ought to knock and announce 
his authority to enter.212 The judge in Semayne also noted:  
For the law without a default in the owner abhors the 
destruction or breaking of any home (which is for the habitation 
and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience 
might ensue to the party, when no default is in him, for perhaps 
he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to 
be presumed that he would obey it.213 
Based on Semayne, a host of other founding era sources,214 and 
a 1958 United States Supreme Court decision, Miller v. United 
States,215 a unanimous Court found that 
Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the 
practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of 
an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure. Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some 
circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home 
might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.216 
                                                                                                     
 208. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). 
 209. See id. at 929 (holding that the court considers if officers “knocked and 
announced” regarding whether a search was reasonable). 
 210. Semayne, 77 Eng. Rep. 
 211. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931. 
 212. Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K. B. 1603); 
see Robert J. Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence 
after Wilson v. Arkansas, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 (1995) (saying that 
the “sheriff was required to announce his authority and purpose.”). 
 213. Id. at 196. 
 214. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–32 (1995). 
 215. 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
 216. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 (1995). The Supreme Court noted in Dalia v. 
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979): 
[That] nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court's 
decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the 
three requirements discussed above, search warrants also must 
include a specification of the precise manner in which they are to be 
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Even when dealing with drug cases the Supreme Court has 
concluded the “knock and announce” rule applies, absent exigent 
circumstances. In Richards v. Wisconsin,217 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court sought to maintain a blanket rule authorizing 
police to conduct no knock entries whenever a search warrant 
involved drugs.218 The Supreme Court struck down the blanket 
rule and announced that  
In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their 
presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective 
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the 
destruction of evidence.219 
The Court in Wilson and Richards noted that there are 
exceptions to the basic knock and announce rule. In Wilson, the 
Court stated that the knock and announce rule could give way 
“under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or 
“[when] police officers have reason to believe that evidence would 
likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.”220 Another 
exception to the knock and announce rule includes situations 
where such an action would be futile.221  
One final case, Hudson v. Michigan,222 regarding the “knock 
and announce” rule, needs to be discussed.223 The question in 
Hudson was whether application of the exclusionary rule was 
appropriate when addressing a knock and announce violation.224 A 
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the performance of a search authorized by warrant—subject of course 
to the general Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
 217. 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
 218. Id. at 388.  
 219. Id. at 394.  
 220. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995); see also Ker v. State of 
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 221. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936. 
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divided Court concluded that it was not.225 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, concluded that the interests protected by the 
knock and announce rule were human life, dignity, and property; 
not shielding evidence from the government.226 Thus, the 
exclusionary rule would not apply where the government’s only 
violation of the Fourth Amendment involved the knock and 
announce rule.227 Justice Scalia also asserted that there were other 
methods of redress, specifically through a civil suit for damages, 
that were adequate.228 
The cases dealing with the knock and announce rule make 
clear that Fourth Amendment reasonableness includes how a 
search is conducted as well as when and what police may search 
for or seize.229 Although Hudson has limited the impact of violating 
the knock and announce rule in criminal trials, it clarifies the 
important interests that are protected by the Fourth Amendment 
beyond privacy.230  Thus, when individuals bring suit for 
unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment the interests at 
stake are even more clear.231 
The standard for bringing a civil suit for a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is high: plaintiffs must establish an 
unreasonable violation of a clearly established rule.232 However, 
the fact that the Court has clarified the knock and announce rule 
does make a civil suit more plausible. The United States Supreme 
Court has not addressed a case whose focus is on civil liability for 
SWAT style techniques, but several of the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have. With greater frequency, these courts have found the 
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use of SWAT techniques, particularly the use of flash bang 
grenades, to provide a proper basis for civil liability.233  
IV. Solutions 
It seems three facts are clear. First, SWAT deployments have 
become excessive.234 Not every drug search is one that is inherently 
dangerous or requires the militarized methods employed by SWAT 
teams.235 Further, SWAT techniques are contrary to several of the 
elements that impact procedural justice.236 Because SWAT units 
operate under an assumption that there is an imminent threat to 
life, limb, or evidence—there is no opportunity for discussion. 
Third, SWAT teams are necessary to confront the situations where 
normal police methods and weapons are inadequate.237 A 
barricaded assailant, hostage situations, or assailants armed with 
military grade weaponry must be responded to in a timely manner. 
It is not realistic to rely on either the non-SWAT police or the 
military. Further, to have a truly effective SWAT unit requires a 
great deal of specialized training and equipment.238 The logical 
conclusion to be derived from these facts is that a coherent SWAT 
policy must reduce police discretion when SWAT deployments 
occur while still retaining the flexibility to use SWAT when 
necessary. The natural body to carry out this function is the 
judiciary. Further, more centralized control over the use of SWAT 
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units is necessary. Thus, states and the federal government should 
create centralized organizations that unify policy and ensure a 
high degree of training and readiness. 
A. Judicial Approval of SWAT Deployments 
Numerous legislatures have, from time to time, passed 
statutes that authorize judges or magistrates to issue “no knock” 
warrants. In 1970, Congress passed the comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act which expressly authorized 
federal judges and magistrates to issue “no knock” warrants.239 
Four years later that express authority was repealed,240 although 
the Supreme Court has found that the authority to execute a no 
knock entry still exists as part of the exigent circumstances 
exception.241 Legislatures could enact statutes that authorized 
judges and magistrates to issue SWAT warrants. Under such a 
regime, police who wish to use SWAT units as part of executing a 
search warrant would have to provide specific articulable facts that 
justify the use of SWAT and the specific SWAT means or methods 
to be used. Such warrants would authorize or deny: active use of 
SWAT officers to execute a warrant; types of weapons authorized; 
whether diversionary devices like smoke or flash bang grenades 
were justified; and whether a knock and announce requirement 
could be suspended.  
By statute, several states allow magistrates to issue “no 
knock” warrants based upon a proper showing by police.242 The 
showing necessary to secure a “no knock” warrant varies. Some 
states require that “the affiant [have] good cause to believe that 
there is a risk of serious physical harm to the law enforcement 
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officers”243 if they adhere to the normal announcement rules, or “a 
showing of specific facts . . . that the officer reasonably believes 
that if notice were given a weapon would be used [or] . . . evidence 
will be destroyed.”244 
The statutes above, and others like them, provide a ground 
work for a more expansive statute that addresses other SWAT 
techniques. A law that requires an affiant to provide specific 
articulable facts, and the source of those facts that justify SWAT 
use, would require the force associated with a SWAT deployment 
be necessary rather than a “just in case” use of force. Further, even 
if a SWAT warrant was sought and not granted, police could have 
SWAT units pre-deployed at the scene of the search and held in 
reserve. Such a pre-deployment would permit police to have SWAT 
teams in vehicles and at the ready if their previously unsupported 
concerns became a reality.  
The above proposed solution, like most compromises, can be 
criticized as having either gone too far or not far enough. 
Traditionally, the manner in which a search warrant is executed 
is left to the judgement of the police, with the caveat that they must 
do so reasonably.245 Such an arrangement gives law enforcement 
front end discretion and thereby greater freedom of action.246 
Those who favor this arrangement will likely argue that police, and 
not judges, are in the best position to assess threats and determine 
what force is appropriate to a given situation. Those most 
concerned with SWAT deployments will likely argue that judges 
are an inadequate barrier to the abuse of SWAT, especially if the 
standard for the use of SWAT is reasonable suspicion rather than 
probable cause. Further, if police are permitted to preposition 
SWAT teams, those inclined to abuse SWAT resources will 
exaggerate claims of exigent circumstances in order to use SWAT 
even when not authorized by a judge.  
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Although all of the above criticisms raise valid concerns, 
restraint and flexibility are required in determining when SWAT 
is appropriate for serving warrants. The claim by police that judges 
are ill equipped to determine when SWAT is needed can be 
remedied by police affidavits thoroughly describing why a 
particular situation requires SWAT methods. The Supreme Court 
has already articulated “reasonable suspicion” as the floor for such 
determinations, at least with regard to “no knock” warrants.247 If 
this were adopted as the standard for other SWAT methods, it 
would be very hard to argue this bar is too high. For those who 
argue that judges will simply become rubber stamps and be overly 
deferential to police, this would seem an indictment of the entire 
search warrant system. It could be argued that matters of safety 
are different than matters of legal authority to search. No judge 
wants to deny a search warrant authorizing SWAT, only to have 
police officers or members of the public harmed from dangerous 
criminals that would have been stopped had SWAT been deployed. 
But, of course, no judge wants to authorize the use of flash-bang 
grenades in a search and have a 71-year-old grandmother suffer a 
heart attack248 or have an officer shot by an innocent home owner 
who responded with force when their home was stormed by armed 
officers who did not announce themselves. In short, judges will 
have to do what they always do: weigh evidence and make a 
determination based on an application of the law to the facts.  
The advantages of judge issued SWAT authorizations are 
several. The requirement to go outside of the law enforcement 
community to receive authorization for SWAT and specific SWAT 
techniques will likely reduce the number of SWAT deployments, or 
at least result in a more universally thoughtful process in 
determining when to deploy and what methods to use. By having 
a neutral and detached magistrate examining the evidence to 
support the use of SWAT and specific methods, law enforcement’s 
capacity to engage in post hoc justification of SWAT use would be 
reduced. The new default position would be to present all the 
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evidence relevant to why SWAT was necessary to the magistrate—
if the deployment is authorized, so be it. If it is not authorized and 
SWAT is used nonetheless, only circumstances that became known 
after the search warrant was sought would be relevant. Officers 
who used SWAT without a warrant could face a greater likelihood 
of civil law suit—since the clearly established rule would be to 
secure a SWAT warrant ahead of executing the warrant. Because 
police could still use SWAT if true exigent circumstances arose, 
SWAT would be put more properly in the “break in case of 
emergency” box that it belongs in.  
B. Centralizing Control over SWAT 
As mentioned above, eighty percent of police departments in 
small cities (25,000–50,000) and virtually all larger police 
departments have SWAT teams.249 Additionally, numerous federal 
agencies allegedly have SWAT or SWAT-like capabilities.250 Many 
of these federal agencies are the sort that clearly should have a 
SWAT capability—the FBI and Secret Service for example. 
However, other organizations like the Department of Education, 
Department of Agriculture, and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, would seem to have little need for SWAT—but they 
nonetheless are alleged to have teams with SWAT capabilities.251  
                                                                                                     
 249. PBS, supra note 108. 
 250. See Rand Paul, Rand Paul: We Must Demilitarize the Police, TIME (Aug. 
14, 2014), http://time.com/3111474/rand-paul-ferguson-police/ (saying that 
“‘federal agencies of all stripes . . . come equipped with SWAT teams and heavy 
artillery.’”). But see Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Rand Paul’s Grand, Inaccurate Retelling 
of “Federal SWAT Team” Raids, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/09/01/rand-pauls-
grand-inaccurate-retelling-of-federal-swat-team-raids/ (discussing that Steve 
Lenkart, Executive Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, 
said that the only federal agency that has an actual SWAT team is the FBI) (on 
file with author). 
 251. Fund, supra note 95.  
Dozens of federal agencies now have Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) teams to further an expanding definition of their 
missions . . . the Department of Agriculture, the Railroad Retirement 
Board . . . . [all of these have their own SWAT units and are part of a 
worrying trend towards the militarization of federal agencies]. 
Id. 
176 23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 135 (2016) 
Most officers who are members of a SWAT team perform their 
SWAT duties part time. In a recent study done by the National 
Tactical Officers Association, 90% of the departments and agencies 
surveyed reported that their SWAT officers were part time, 
meaning that the officers were participating in SWAT activities as 
part of their police work rather than all the time.252 In that same 
survey, most officers responding claimed the policies and 
procedures for their SWAT units were derived from their own 
agency.253 However, it is necessary to note that the results of this 
question on the study are confusing. Officers and agencies were 
asked about the sources for their unit’s training and policies.254 
The results were the following: 85.4% stated the source was their 
own agency; 41.6% stated the source was state/regional tactical 
officers associations; 35.5% stated the source was municipal or 
county law enforcement agencies; 7.3% claimed the source was 
private vendors; 10.6% claimed state law enforcement agency; 
7.1% stated the U.S. military; 5.1% stated federal law enforcement 
agency; and 4.7% stated other.255 In order for these percentages to 
be correct, respondents to the survey must have listed multiple 
sources. Based on the above information, SWAT units are part 
time, spread across county, city, and state police departments, or 
a wide range of federal agencies, some of which would appear to 
have little need for SWAT capabilities. Such a diffuse distribution 
of assets is arguably wasteful and, likely to result in misuse of 
SWAT assets.  
Maintaining a SWAT unit is resource intensive, even on a 
part-time basis. The current recommended guidelines from the 
National Tactical Officers Associations for part-time SWAT 
officers are substantial. The minimum recommended standards 
are the following: prerequisite, forty hours basic SWAT course; 
monthly, sixteen hours critical skills maintenance; specialty 
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assignments, an additional eight hours per month (i.e., long rifle, 
tactical emergency medical support, etc.); annual, forty hours in-
service full team training.256  
Even assuming that police departments are following 
minimum standards for their part-time SWAT units such training 
is likely inadequate for the SWAT mission. This conclusion is 
based on the National Tactical Officers Association guidelines for 
full time SWAT units.257 The recommended minimum amount of 
training time for full time SWAT units is 25% of a duty month.258 
Thus, to meet minimum recommended standards, officers should 
be training one in four days.259 If the two-days-a-month minimum 
suggested for part-time SWAT units was enough, then there would 
be no reason to require more for full time units. 
Centralizing command and control over state SWAT units and 
federal units would also lead to greater standardization of 
procedure. Currently, SWAT standards appear to come from 
multiple sources, including state agencies, federal agencies, the 
United States military, local and regional law enforcement 
agencies, commercial sources, and others.260  
By creating full time SWAT units under a single command in 
a given state or the federal government, policies and procedures 
could be standardized across the state or federal government. Such 
a system would remove unnecessary and unhelpful administrative 
redundancies and streamline changes that create more effective 
SWAT deployments. A system of top down review of SWAT actions 
would include all SWAT units, not just those departments that 
choose to be reflective about SWAT activity. Finally, centralizing 
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control for SWAT units at the state or federal level could create a 
SWAT system that is more responsive to public concerns about 
overuse of SWAT. It can be difficult to find the “responsible 
individual” in the current system. Who decides to deploy SWAT 
and when can be different depending on the town, or state, or 
federal agency.261 The NTOA study discussed above observed that 
currently the authority to deploy SWAT assets can reside in any of 
the following depending on the jurisdiction: the first officer at the 
scene; the field supervisor; the watch commander; the SWAT 
commander; the Mayor; a county executive; or other.262 With a 
single chain of command that ultimately leads to a governor or the 
President it is easier to find with whom the buck stops. One of the 
several factors that enhances a sense of procedural justice 
observed by Professor Tyler is the sense of knowing who a 
complaint can be brought to and a mechanism for accountability.263 
Centralizing the chain of command for SWAT units can thereby 
enhance a sense of procedural justice. 
Of course there are a number of arguments that can be raised 
against centralizing the SWAT chain of command. Two in 
particular deserve discussion. First, that consolidating SWAT 
assets to a state or federal chain of command and limiting it to full-
time SWAT officers will make SWAT less responsive to time 
sensitive events. Second, that the proposal is financially 
untenable—currently 90% of SWAT units are part-time.264 By 
requiring SWAT units to be full time the state or federal 
government would have to significantly, if not massively, expand 
the number of its law enforcement officers.  
Response time for SWAT units is a valid concern. Any program 
that seeks to centralize control over SWAT assets would have to 
include response time concerns into whatever calculus they use to 
determine where SWAT assets should be prepositioned. 
Additionally, law enforcement communication systems would have 
to be streamlined to ensure that police departments which did not 
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have SWAT units collocated with them could rapidly request a 
SWAT deployment if the need arose. Although SWAT 
responsiveness is an appropriate concern, most SWAT 
deployments are thoroughly planned and deliberately executed. 
Currently most SWAT operations are not like deploying 
firefighters; SWAT officials usually know hours or more that the 
unit is going to deploy.265   
Next is a question of personnel and funding. It could be argued 
that if state and federal executives required that SWAT units be 
staffed by full time officers our nation’s police forces must grow 
dramatically. This is not the case. Although the statistics on this 
question are somewhat unclear, some police forces and agencies 
already have full time SWAT officers.266 Additionally, officers who 
were conducting part-time SWAT duties would now be available to 
either be a full-time SWAT officer or full-time police officer 
performing traditional law enforcement duties. This division 
would alleviate some of the personnel pressure a full-time 
consolidated SWAT organization would create. Finally, funding for 
SWAT units or assets that have little justification, like the 
Department of Agriculture’s, could be redirected and more 
efficiently used. Finally, if SWAT units are used as originally 
intended, to address hostage situations, riots, and other 
circumstances beyond the capabilities of normal police assets, less 
officers will be needed because the number of deployments will be 
reduced. 
V. Conclusion 
Overuse of SWAT means and methods is contrary to the 
essential elements of procedural justice, just as overuse of martial 
law is contrary to civil liberty. However, SWAT, like martial law, 
is a necessary executive tool to protect the public under certain 
limited circumstances. By interjecting prior judicial authorization 
to SWAT deployments for search warrants and by requiring 
magistrates to authorize specific means and methods (use of 
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battering rams, flash bang grenades, dynamic entry), an important 
check would be placed on the overuse of this law enforcement 
resource. Further, by requiring a prior judicial process before the 
use of such force, the public can more effectively challenge 
decisions to use SWAT. In states that elect their judges, 
magistrates that are too quick or lax in issuing SWAT search 
warrants can be voted out of office. Further, when police elect to 
use SWAT in the absence of prior judicial authorization, a civil suit 
would have a greater likelihood of success. Finally, by 
consolidating SWAT resources and chains of command, SWAT can 
be returned to its proper use, in circumstances where standard 
police resources are inadequate. 
